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Abstract. Since 1989, there have been organized seven national referenda 
related to thirteen questions in Hungary. Based on the content of the questions 
raised, one can draw a line of evolution in the history of the institution: 
the symbolic political issues of the transition and democracy-building were 
followed by the country’s main strategic aims. Later, national referenda 
functioned as instruments of outsourced daily political debate between 
government and opposition, while at present – based on practice – national 
referendum can be considered as a typical instrument of plebiscitarian 
direct democracy. Moreover, during this period, sixteen questions were set 
on the National Assembly’s agenda based on successful popular initiatives .
Since 2010, the legislative and the executive power’s approach to direct 
democracy has radically transformed. The Government started to use 
frequently the so-called national consultation in important legislative 
issues – a misleading communication tool which has no legal background. 
Besides, based on the new Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) and the new 
Act on Electoral Procedure (2013), the possibility of a successful national 
referendum has been greatly restricted: there is prescribed as a necessary 
condition for a valid result that the majority of the voters should cast a valid 
vote. This condition was barely reached twice in the preceding period. 
Furthermore, the institution of popular initiative is not part of the legal 
system anymore .
These trends are demonstrating that the classic tools of direct democracy are 
losing their relevance, while populist instruments are used more frequently 
in practice . The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the contemporary 
debate related to this challenge .
Keywords: national referendum, national consultation, minority direct 
democracy, plebiscitarian direct democracy
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I. The Way We Should Think about Direct Democracy
Why are questions related to direct democracy relevant? One can assume that the 
usual tools of direct democracy do have weak influence on politics in parliamentary 
democracies. In modern societies – which are divided by different experiences, 
preferences, and opinions of their members –, there is no better option to reach a 
decision which represents the presumed interest of the community than a majoritarian 
decision-making of representative bodies. If parliaments are formed based on free 
and fair elections, then the majoritarian decisions of these – from the formal point of 
view – can be considered legitimate without any doubt. Moreover, the open debate 
in parliament can deliberate alternative opinions in complex social issues and 
therefore offers a useful framework to control the actions of the government.
However, the support of the majority of the elected representatives is not the 
only requirement related to decision-making in modern democratic societies. The 
famous phrase about the ‘tyranny of the majority’1 demonstrates that the interests 
of the actual majority in some cases can counter the rights or interests of minorities 
in a way which is not acceptable. This is the case when fundamental rights are 
limited, other constitutional values are infringed, or certain minorities simply do 
not have the chance to raise their voice. Rules which function as safeguards and 
techniques related to the decision-making process can also effectively prevent 
such situations. In the case of parliaments, the veto power of the head of the 
state, the judicial review of the legislative decisions, and also the tools of direct 
democracy are traditional external limits of majoritarian power . The open debate 
in parliament which can deliberate alternative opinions, as well as supermajority 
requirements, can be considered as internal limits of the majority .
Direct democracy has special relevance in other aspects as well. It is not only 
an external limit of the majoritarian power but rather it is a tool which is in 
close connection with the principle of people’s sovereignty. When people have 
a right to participate directly in the most important decisions of the community, 
their position is similarly strong as in the case when they authorize the elected 
representatives to act in their names. One can state that referenda and other tools 
of direct democracy are not necessary preconditions of constitutional states . 
One can also add that in many countries with remarkable constitutional history 
and practice this institution is not available to the citizens.2 However, in case a 
constitution opens these modalities of exercising power for the members of the 
political community, these should be taken seriously. The right to participate at 
a referendum is a political right which calls for sufficient procedural safeguards.
1 For the classic approaches, see Madison (1787) and Tocqueville (1835).
2 According to the database of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA), 57% of 188 countries use mandatory referenda, while 64% use optional referenda at the 
national level .
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II. Trends Related to the Practice of Direct Democracy in 
Hungary (1989–2011)
The classic tools of direct democracy are relatively new institutions in Hungary, 
introduced right after the fall of the ‘state-socialist’ regime in 1989. The most 
relevant tools used at the national level were referenda and the institution of 
people’s initiative .
In the preceding period, citizens participated six times at referenda to express 
their opinion in altogether twelve questions. At the end of 1989, in the so-called 
‘four yeses’ referendum, the questions raised were related to the following topics: 
(a) the timing of the election of the president of the republic (the head of the state), 
(b) the dissolution of the party militia, (c) the prohibition of party organizations 
at workplaces, and (d) the report on the state-socialist party’s property. Right 
after the ‘four yeses’ referendum, in 1990, there was organized a referendum 
on the modality of electing the president (directly or by the parliament). The 
1997 referendum concerned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
membership, while the 2003 referendum the accession to the European Union. In 
2004, citizens could vote for two issues: (a) the citizenship of native Hungarians 
living outside the country and (b) the privatization of hospitals. The 2008 
referendum concerned three questions closely related to social policies (the 
so-called ‘social referenda’): (a) daily inpatient fee in hospitals, (b) outpatient 
medical consultation fee, and (c) university tuition fee.
It seems appropriate to assess these referenda from a broader perspective – that 
of the position of the political community .
In 1989 and in 1990, the questions were closely related to the important political 
issues of the transition and democracy-building. In 1989 – in the absence of a 
freely elected parliament –, some of the then opposition parties intended to put 
symbolic questions on the political agenda in order to build up political support 
for their organizations.
The referenda on the NATO (1997) and EU membership (2003) form the second 
stage in this line of evolution . These questions concerned the country’s main 
strategic aims – therefore, the referenda were to some extent solemn declarations 
of the will of the political community.
The referendum has become an outsourced instrument of the daily political 
debate between government and opposition since 2004. All the questions raised 
in 2004 and 2008 were initiated with the support of the then opposition parties . 
One can also note that the 2008 ‘social referenda’ were obviously successful from 
the point of view of the initiators as they resulted in the symbolic political defeat 
of the prime minister and the governing parties . This period could be considered 
as the third stage in the history of national referenda .
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The issues set on the agenda of the National Assembly by the people’s initiative 
show a variety of the topics based on the actual interests of the initiators. The 
National Assembly dealt with altogether 16 questions based on people’s initiatives 
in the preceding period, in four cases deciding in accordance with the original 
proposal of the initiators .
At this point, it is worth mentioning the way the Constitutional Court assessed 
the function of direct democracy in the constitutional system of Hungary based 
on the previous Constitution (1989) and the legal background. In the early years, 
the Constitutional Court stated that ‘in the constitutional order of Hungary the 
primary form of exercising popular sovereignty is representation’.3 The statement 
had special relevance, as the relation between direct and representative democracy 
was not stipulated in the text of the Constitution at that time. Four years later, 
the Court declared that ‘the direct exercise of power is an exceptional form of 
exercising popular sovereignty, but in exceptional cases when it is actually realized 
it stands above the exercise of power through representatives’.4 The assessment 
is to some extent controversial as it can be interpreted as a clarification of the 
principle explained in the previous decision, while at the same time as well as a 
new principle which contradicts the former. It is also important to note that the 
Constitutional Court interpreted the relationship between direct democracy and 
the constitution-amending power as well, declaring that ‘the Constitution cannot 
be amended – on the basis of a voter imitative – through a referendum’.5 One can 
add that the Constitution did not contain a restriction in this respect .
III. Regulation after 2011
The Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) in many aspects sustained the 
institutions of direct democracy used since 1989. The text of the Fundamental Law 
repeats the former ascertainments (including the possible implicit contradictions) 
of the Constitutional Court on the relationship between representative and direct 
democracy .6 On the other hand, the Fundamental Law modified the way direct 
democracy can be exercised in important aspects.
Based on the former regulation, a national referendum has to be ordered 
mandatory by the National Assembly based on the imitation of at least 200,000 
citizens eligible to vote, while a national referendum could be ordered by the 
discretionary resolution of the Parliament based on the imitation of (a) at 
least 100,000 citizens eligible to vote, (b) the President of the Republic, (c) the 
3 Decision 2/1993. (I. 22.) CC.
4 Decision 52/1997. (X. 14.) CC.
5 Decision 25/1999. (VII. 7.) CC.
6 See Article B Section (4) of the Fundamental Law.
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Government, and (d) at least one third of the elected MPs. The Fundamental Law 
sustained the regulation in this respect, except the imitation of the MPs – therefore, 
the sphere of action of parliamentary minorities is weakened in this regard .
A national referendum can be initiated exclusively in a question which falls 
within the competence of the National Assembly, as the parliament is the addressee 
of the question raised. The Fundamental Law contains a detailed list on the topics 
in which no referendum may be organized.7 The most of these topics are ‘classic’, 
well-known in other country regulations and the former Hungarian Constitution 
as well (e.g. central budget, international treaties, declaration of state of war, etc.). 
However, the new list of the ‘excluded topics’ of the Fundamental Law contains 
two new elements: (a) matters aimed at the amendment to the Fundamental Law 
(a ban earlier declared by the Constitutional Court) and (b) the content of the Acts 
on the elections. One can note that based on the new regulation the members of 
the political community have less sphere of action to influence the way they elect 
their representatives .
Based on the former constitution, there was no validity requirement related to 
the turnout: a referendum was conclusive if at least one quarter of the total number 
of citizens had given identical answer to the question concerned. However, the 
Fundamental Law prescribes a rigid validity requirement: a national referendum 
shall be valid if more than half of all voters participate at the referendum and 
cast valid votes. One can note that the new validity requirement is not easy to 
comply with: citizens participated at referenda in such proportion only twice in 
the previous period .8
According to the Fundamental Law, the outcome of the valid referendum is 
always binding on the Parliament for a three-year period, while based on the 
former regulation consultative referenda (referenda with no binding effect) also 
existed. This modification demonstrates that the effects of national referenda are 
stronger .
It is also an important new element of the Fundamental Law in this regard 
that the people’s initiative is no longer part of direct democracy in Hungary. It 
is remarkable that this institution was a balanced tool to influence politics9 in a 
way which was suitable to overcome the classic conflict between representative 
and direct democracy .
7 See Article 8 Section (3) of the Fundamental Law.
8 The voter turnouts were the following: 1989: 58.03%, 1990: 14.01%, 1997: 49.25%, 2003: 
45.62%, 2004: 37.49%, 2008: 50.51%, 2016: 41.32%.
9 See Article 28/D of the 1989 Constitution: At least 50,000 voting citizens are required for a 
national popular initiative. A national popular initiative may be for the purpose of forcing the 
Parliament to place a subject under its jurisdiction on the agenda. The Parliament shall debate 
the subject defined by the national popular initiative.
114 Zoltán Pozsár-Szentmiklósy
IV. Trends Related to the Practice of Direct Democracy 
in Hungary after 2011
During the heated debates related to the drafting process of the Fundamental 
Law (2010–2011), it has been suggested that the new constitution of the country 
needs stronger legitimacy than that of the MPs of the governing coalition (Fidesz10 
and KDNP11), which maintained two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in the 
parliamentary term of 2010–2014. However, the governing parties maintaining 
the exclusive supermajority power expressed that they have no intention to 
confirm the Fundamental Law by a national referendum – a possibility opened 
based on the 1989 Constitution,12 which was in force at that time. It is well-
known that the unilateral constitution-making process was intensively criticized 
by opposition parties, scholars,13 NGO-s, and international organizations.14
On the contrary, the Government started to use national consultations in order 
to ask for the opinion of the voters in daily policy issues – for the second time on 
questions related to the Fundamental Law. Before passing the Fundamental Law, 
every citizen received a simplified questionnaire, which contained 12 questions. 
Questions about complex constitutional issues and fundamental rights were 
formulated in a very simple way and even suggested the expected answers. The 
unilateral consultation, which lacked any professional or ethical standards, was 
not suitable for any ‘in-merit consultation’ even if approximately 10 percent of 
the citizens returned their answers to the Government. It is also doubtful whether 
these answers had any effect on the drafting process of the Fundamental Law. 
One can add that since 2010 altogether five national consultations have been 
organized in Hungary, and the sixth one takes place in 2017.
It is important to note that Hungarian national consultations are clearly different 
from the complex methods with similar name and known from comparative 
constitutional law. The recommendation of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights for post-conflict states in matters of transitional justice15 or the 
constitutional practice of some Latin American states16 can be mentioned in 
this respect . The Hungarian national consultation has neither constitutional 
foundations nor any special function in the decision-making processes of 
10 Alliance of Young Democrats.
11 Christian Democratic People’s Party.
12 See Article 26. Section (6) of the 1989 Constitution.
13 For detailed analysis on the question of legitimacy, see Sonnevend–Jakab–Csink 2015. 33–109.
14 In its Opinion on the new constitution of Hungary (Venice, 17–18 June 2011), the Venice 
Commission stated the following: ‘it is regrettable that the constitution-making process, 
including the drafting and the final adoption of the new Constitution, has been affected by a 
lack of transparency, shortcomings in the dialogue between the majority and the opposition, the 
insufficient opportunities for an adequate public debate, and a very tight timeframe’.
15 See: http://www.ohchr.org/documents/Publications/NationalConsultationsTJ_EN.pdf.
16 See Barczak 2001. 37–60.
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the political community. Even though it seems like a similar technique to the 
national referendum, in practice, it is quite different . The questions raised, and 
even the possible answers, are formulated exclusively by the Government, there 
are no constitutional safeguards related to the procedure (including judicial 
review), and the legal consequences are uncertain. As a result, the use of national 
consultations – as communication tools – can be considered as the illusion of 
direct democracy .
The fifth national consultation on immigration and terrorism was held in 
the summer of 2015 aiming at building up public support for the restricting 
immigration policy of the Government. In the following period, extremely 
restrictive legal measures took place in Hungary as a reaction to the European 
refugee crisis. The measures taken were intensively criticized by the international 
community .17
As a symbolic element of this immigration policy, on 16 February 2016, the 
Government initiated a national referendum on the following question: ‘Do you 
want to allow the European Union to mandate the resettlement of non-Hungarian 
citizens to Hungary without the approval of the National Assembly?’ The 
National Election Committee authenticated the question,18 and later its decision 
was approved by the Curia19 (the Supreme Court of Hungary). Both decisions 
generated intensive critiques,20 as they did not take into account that (a) the 
addressee of the question was not the National Assembly but the European Union, 
(b) the issue of the referendum (the possible constraints of the European Union) 
was an ‘excluded topic’ as it is regulated in an international (European) treaty, 
and (c) the question was not worded in a manner that allows a straightforward 
response. At the referendum organized on the 2nd of October 2016, only 41.32% 
of the voters cast valid votes; therefore, the validity requirement prescribed in 
the Fundamental Law was not met. However, later, the Government initiated an 
amendment to the Fundamental Law related to this topic, which was eventually 
not supported by the National Assembly .21
As a consequence, the national referendum functioned as an instrument of 
populist majoritarian politics in 2016 as the newest stage in the line of evolution 
of the institution in Hungary .
17 See also the detailed analysis of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).
18 See Decision 14/2016 of the National Election Committee.
19 See the Decision Knk. IV.37.222/2016/9 of the Curia.
20 Halmai 2016, Pozsár-Szentmiklósy 2016. 77–84.
21 On the analysis of the proposed Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law, see Uitz 2016.
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V. The Way We Should Use Direct Democracy
From a broader perspective, there are many arguments supporting direct 
democracy as well as convincing counter-arguments.
Direct democracy can effectively influence legislation in many cases. 
Moreover, it can function as counterbalance of the parliamentary majority: as 
a result of a national referendum, political actors are under greater pressure to 
meet minority demands. This phenomenon can lead to a consensus-orientated 
decision-making process.22 A national referendum can also function as a very 
spectacular way to express the political opinion of the active members of the 
political community .
On the other hand, strong arguments are demonstrating that direct democracy 
has more disadvantages. In many cases, initiatives directly target minority 
interests by supporting the preferences of the actual majority .23 Due to the fact 
that the tools of direct democracy do not offer a deliberate process, ‘people often 
vote about initiatives without really understanding what they’re about’.24 It is 
also a strong argument that ‘while the principle of separation of powers offers a 
structural protection for the most important constitutional values by effecting a 
diffusion of powers among the different branches of the government, in the case 
of direct democracy, checks and balances do not function’.25
Both approaches face a ‘collective dilemma’ on relying on median voters on 
matters of collective deliberation and restraining at the same time the median 
voter on issues related to individual rights .26 For the possible solution of 
the dilemma, it seems useful to distinguish between the main types of direct 
democracy on a functional basis. Silvano Moeckli differentiates between 
minority direct democracy, where ‘a minority of qualified voters or members of 
parliament can bring an issue before the electorate against the will of the political 
majority’, and plebiscitary direct democracy, where ‘a political majority holds a 
referendum on an issue that it could decide on its own’.27 In this sense, minority 
direct democracy can bear the possible advantages of direct democracy, while 
plebiscitary direct democracy has probably more disadvantages .28
22 Moeckli 2006. 107–124 (especially 118.).
23 See Chemerinsky 2007. 293–306 (especially 297.).
24 See Chemerinsky 2007. 299.
25 See Chemerinsky 2007. 296.
26 See Epstein 2011. 819–826 (especially 823.). The author also emphasizes that ‘no constitutional 
democracy can afford to neglect either part of the two-step game’. See Epstein 2011. 823.
27 See Moeckli 2006. 107.
28 The influence on the legislation, counterbalancing parliamentary absolutism, and the protection 
of minority interests can be mentioned as the possible benefits of direct democracy, while 
populist campaigns, avoiding compromise solutions, and the exclusiveness of the majority 
opinion as typical weaknesses. See Morel 2012. 501–528, 502–507.
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In the Hungarian legal order, both functional types of direct democracy are 
present. Many of the elements of the new regulation (excluding the initiation of 
a national referendum by the parliamentary minority, extension of the ‘excluded 
topics’, prescribing a higher turnout requirement, excluding the consultative 
referenda and the people’s initiative) are weakening the sphere of action for 
minority direct democracy, while worrying tendencies (the frequent use of 
national consultations, initiating a national referendum by the Government in 
a question which is already decided, questionable decisions of the National 
Election Committee and the Curia) are strengthening the effects of plebiscitary 
direct democracy .
It is high time to shift to focusing to the genuine exercise of political rights 
related to direct democracy .
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